for your reason

Earlier this evening as I conversed through the web with my dear sister Jackie, I was confronted as many a time before with the phrase 'happened [or] happens for a reason'; frequently appended to the sentence fragments 'I just have to tell myslef....' or 'I feel relieved because I know it....'. I have always been perplexed by the expression, and after some consideration have decided I prefer to make use of the words so oft spoken by the great Mr. Downs Baggage, 'shit happens'. Note there is no reason there; I will tell you why.

In his work 'Twilight of The Idols', philosopher Freidrich
Nitzsche attacks the deeply rooted and cultural foundations and general mindset which western society has inherited from his arch enemies, worshipers of reason, Socrates and Plato. I have pasted below a (lengthy) excerp from his greater text in which he addresses the said theme of this post:

The error of a false causality. People have believed at all times that they knew what a cause is; but whence did we take our knowledge--or more precisely, our faith--that we had such knowledge? From the realm of the famous "inner facts," of which not a single one has so far proved to be factual. We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing: we thought that here at least we caught causality in the act. Nor did one doubt that all the antecedents of an act, its causes, were to be sought in consciousness and would be found there once sought--as "motives": else one would not have been free and responsible for it. Finally, who would have denied that a thought is caused? that the ego causes the thought?

Of these three "inward facts" which seem to guarantee causality, the first and most persuasive is that of the will as cause. The conception of a consciousness ("spirit") as a cause, and later also that of the ego as cause (the "subject"), are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly accepted as given, as empirical.

Meanwhile we have thought better of it. Today we no longer believe a word of all this. The "inner world" is full of phantoms and will-o'-the-wisps: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, hence does not explain anything either--it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent. The so-called motive: another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness, something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deeds than to represent them. And as for the ego! That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words: it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will!

What follows from this? There are no mental causes at all. The whole of the allegedly empirical evidence for that has gone to the devil. That is what follows! And what a fine abuse we had perpetrated with this "empirical evidence"; we created the world on this basis as a world of causes, a world of will, a world of spirits. The most ancient and enduring psychology was at work here and did not do anything else: all that happened was considered a doing, all doing the effect of a will; the world became to it a multiplicity of doers; a doer (a "subject") was slipped under all that happened. It was out of himself that man projected his three "inner facts"--that in which he believed most firmly: the will, the spirit, the ego. He even took the concept of being from the concept of the ego; he posited "things" as "being," in his image, in accordance with his concept of the ego as a cause. Small wonder that later he always found in things only that which he had put into them. The thing itself, to say it once more, the concept of thing is a mere reflex of the faith in the ego as cause. And even your atom, my dear mechanists and physicists--how much error, how much rudimentary psychology is still residual in your atom! Not to mention the "thing-in-itself," the horrendum pudendum of the metaphysicians! The error of the spirit as cause mistaken for reality! And made the very measure of reality! And called God!

So what comes of all this? Nietzsche, in his omnipresent rejection of the utility and value of reason (which is to say a rejection of the rationality of reality itself), is critical- no, furious- about the insistence of ordering and explaining our circumstances, a habit resulting from three basic ideas. One, the 'will', two, the 'spirit', and three, the 'ego' as causes (as the 'reasons')of events. His criticism is based on his faith in the irrationality of the world. (this brings to mind Robert M. Pirsig's book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance when he speaks of the great failure of the scientific method in that there exist an infinite number of possible hypothesis for any single phenomenon, making it impossible to ever come to a single consensus as to the cause of an event. The 'truth' of a theory is nothing more than a group of scientists' faith in a particular explanation. They limit the phenomenon by molding it into the paradigm they have created, so that it may fit into the already disastrously contadictory web of rational theories. As Nietzsche states, 'he always found in things only that which he had put into them.')

I think it would be easy to focus in on what Nietzsche is getting at by checking his logic so to say- thinking out whether or not we agree with his assertion that the world is not rational, reason is useless, and that the will is a figment of our imagination. Doing so would be to miss the point; indeed, we would be using the very logic Nietzche abhors. Instead, we would serve oursleves better to recognize that, given Pirsig's line of thinking with respect to a sort of 'faith' in our explanation of phenomenon, the world quite simply is what we make of it. A rationalist will see the world as inherintly rational, and in doing so will set his snout about the task of finding evidence to prove just that. Equally so, the irrationalist will, like his counterpart, go about the task of proving that in fact his view of the world is correct. The nature of the world, in both cases, I think would allow the fool to find enough evidence to 'prove' to himself the validity of his theory. And this is why Nietzsche is so brilliant! He acknowledges this in Twilight of the Idols:

When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration, with the way of looking at things, which is part of life: life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values. From this it follows that even that anti-natural morality which conceives of God as the counter-concept and condemnation of life is only a value judgment of life--but of what life? of what kind of life? I have already given the answer: of declining, weakened, weary, condemned life.

So he admits that he and his philosophical enemies have drunk from the same cup- both have plucked their respective ideas from the same reality. But the key idea is that he who takes from life experience a need to search out a rational system of 'object' and 'subject'; and 'will', morality, and responsiblity before God, has found only a 'declining, weary,(and) condemned' path.

What about our path? Have I lost the train to thought? Perhaps. Is there a connection to things 'happening for a reason' with all of this mumbo gumbo? I think so, because the pranker (thats a good new word for guy or dude) who attributes all of his mysteries or problems to some 'reason' has been asking 'why?' too much. He's not just thinking- he's thinking about thinking (this goes back to a post a few days ago). He has to find a reason to be assured- because letting something go without explanation would be a scary unknown. So he plasters his ideas of cause and effect all over the various occurences of his everyday life. Living isn't an instictual reaction to circumstances anymore- it's a state of living in the past, a great web weaving activity of criss-crossing logical patterns and moralities. Eventually the web blinds the pranker, the joker, the dude. He's sitting there looking at the web wrapped around his face saying, 'Well, Dick, you're flattened in the street because a big fucking bus just smacked the holy living shit out of you.'

I do recognize, however, that the implied meaning of the phrase 'happened for a reason' refers to some spiritual sort of greater cause- a higher being looking down fixing things up for us so that everything works out swell. I can sort of appreciate this. I mean, if someone can see all events in this light with a sort of optimism by saying the bad has to happen in order to arrive at the good, well OK. I'm just saying it's not for me. You know- shit happens- like it happened to Dick. The only acceptable 'reason' to me for anything being as it is, would be that the universe was as it was before the thing was. That sounds mental so allow me to clarify...

The state in which all existed up until the realization of event A is the reason for event A. This is the chaos theory. A butterfly flaps its wings atop a summit in Japan and tsunamis leave California coastline in ruin. Events are influenced by specks of matter smaller than the smallest part of an atom man has mapped out, and phenomenon greater than the greatest universal trends man has followed. For this reason, as stated before with respect to infinite hypothesis, we can never know all the causes. Because the cause is everything. The cause is the whole:

'...there is nothing which could judge, measure, compare, or sentence our being, for that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, or sentencing the whole. But there is nothing besides the whole...'

So other than our faithful pranker, who sees events as a sort of divine intervention, it's rather ridiculous to state 'something happened for a reason.' It just happened because it just did. I mean there's no reason apples taste the way they do. They could just as well taste like dog turd, but they don't. The bozo would argue that the taste of apples results from the balance of organic component c-43526 and citric acid 25362728 in the 'meaty tissue' of the fruit. Yes, pucker pouch but why does organic component c-43526 and citric whats-her-face taste as they do? He'd continue to go on about the chemical reaction between our tast buds and the microstructure of the apple's tissue-completely missing the point. The annoying toddler is justified in asking why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why?why? We get pissed off because our 'knowledge' reaches a limit. The reasons either get too small for our understanding or too big. The point being that the cause of something is part of an infinite chain reaction that goes so small and so big that it folds in on itself. Searching out a reason turns out to be a search for THE reason, the great reason for existence. But that is, of course, a useless question to ponder. As Nietzsche explains,

'One would require a position outside of life, and yet have to know it as well as one, as many, as all who have lived it, in order to be permitted even to touch the problem of the value of life: reasons enough to comprehend that this problem is for us an unapproachable problem.'

I think I've reached the end for this evening's monster post. If you're still reading at this point, I can't belive it. Before I go though, look at this tasty nonsense: Everything happens for a reason, but the reason is everything, ergo the verb to happen= verb to be, ergo to happen= to be, ergo energy=matter.

The following several paragraphs are the remains of the original excerp from 'Twilight of the Idols' which I used in several spots above. They follow the same line of thought of this wacko post...enjoy them- if you dare:

To begin with dreams: ex post facto, a cause is slipped under a particular sensation (for example, one following a far-off cannon shot)--often a whole little novel in which the dreamer turns up as the protagonist. The sensation endures meanwhile in a kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until the causal instinct permits it to step into the foreground--now no longer as a chance occurrence, but as "meaning." The cannon shot appears in a causal mode, in an apparent reversal of time. What is really later, the motivation, is experienced first--often with a hundred details which pass like lightning and the shot follows. What has happened? The representations which were produced by a certain state have been misunderstood as its causes.

In fact, we do the same thing when awake. Most of our general feelings--every kind of inhibition, pressure, tension, and explosion in the play and counterplay of our organs, and particularly the state of the nervus sympaticus--excite our causal instinct: we want to have a reason for feeling this way or that--for feeling bad or for feeling good. We are never satisfied merely to state the fact that we feel this way or that: we admit this fact only--become conscious of it only--when we have furnished some kind of motivation. Memory, which swings into action in such cases, unknown to us, brings up earlier states of the same kind, together with the causal interpretations associated with them--not their real causes. The faith, to be sure, that such representations, such accompanying conscious processes are the causes is also brought forth by memory. Thus originates a habitual acceptance of a particular causal interpretation, which, as a matter of fact, inhibits any investigation into the real cause--even precludes it.

To derive something unknown from something familiar relieves, comforts, and satisfies, besides giving a feeling of power. With the unknown, one is confronted with danger, discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish these painful states. First principle: any explanation is better than none. Since at bottom it is merely a matter of wishing to be rid of oppressive representations, one is not too particular about the means of getting rid of them: the first representation that explains the unknown as familiar feels so good that one "considers it true." The proof of pleasure ("of strength") as a criterion of truth.

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause--a cause that is comforting, liberating, and relieving. That it is something already familiar, experienced, and inscribed in the memory, which is posited as a cause, that is the first consequence of this need. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one searches not only for some kind of explanation to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which has most quickly and most frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new, and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. Consequence: one kind of positing of causes predominates more and more, is concentrated into a system and finally emerges as dominant, that is, as simply precluding other causes and explanations. The banker immediately thinks of "business," the Christian of "sin," and the girl of her love.

The whole realm of morality and religion belongs under this concept of imaginary causes. The "explanation" of disagreeable general feelings. They are produced by beings that are hostile to us (evil spirits: the most famous case--the misunderstanding of the hysterical as witches). They are produced by acts which cannot be approved (the feeling of "sin," of "sinfulness," is slipped under a physiological discomfort; one always finds reasons for being dissatisfied with oneself). They are produced as punishments, as payment for something we should not have done, for what we should not have been (impudently generalized by Schopenhauer into a principle in which morality appears as what it really is--as the very poisoner and slanderer of life: "Every great pain, whether physical or spiritual, declares what we deserve; for it could not come to us if we did not deserve it." World as Will and Representation II, 666). They are produced as effects of ill-considered actions that turn out badly. (Here the affects, the senses, are posited as causes, as "guilty"; and physiological calamities are interpreted with the help of other calamities as "deserved.")

The "explanation" of agreeable general feelings. They are produced by trust in God. They are produced by the consciousness of good deeds (the so-called "good conscience"--a physiological state which at times looks so much like good digestion that it is hard to tell them apart). They are produced by the successful termination of some enterprise (a naive fallacy: the successful termination of some enterprise does not by any means give a hypochondriac or a Pascal agreeable general feelings). They are produced by faith, charity, and hope--the Christian virtues.

In truth, all these supposed explanations are resultant states and, as it were, translations of pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings into a false dialect: one is in a state of hope because the basic physiological feeling is once again strong and rich; one trusts in God because the feeling of fullness and strength gives a sense of rest. Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes.